[K:JNWTS 28/2 (September 2013): 16-26]

Muller on the Trinity: A Review[1]

Scott F. Sanborn

Muller introduces this volume by noting that the scholarship in this area differs from that dealing with prolegomena, Scripture and the divine attributes. Thus, this volume begins with a survey of the scholarship in this area, including a discussion of historiographical issues.

Muller examines the historical development of the doctrine of the Trinity from the early Middle ages to 18th century late Reformed scholasticism. In accord with the general pattern of the other volumes in Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics (hereafter referred to as PRRD), this is followed by an examination of the doctrine of the Trinity in Reformed orthodoxy using a more topical arrangement.

Muller points to the predominance of Patristic studies with respect to the Trinity. This is why he begins his historical analysis in this volume with a discussion of the Medieval background to the doctrine of the Trinity and not with the Patristic period. We will take space here to highlight a few of these developments briefly.

Muller examines how Anselm sought to refute Roscellin’s conception of the Trinity, leading up to the Synod of Soissons in 1092. Roscellin applied his nominalism to the three persons of the Trinity. As a result, for Roscellin, the names Father, Son, and Spirit were simply names applied to the divine nature. They did not represent personal distinctions within the Godhead. Anselm rightly rejected this, in part using his realist philosophy. Muller also deals with Abelard and his conceptualist approach to the Trinity.

The definition of a person takes on significance in the doctrine of the Trinity beginning with Boethius. Muller notes the original definition of person suggested by Boethius: “person is an individual substance of a rational nature” (34). He also recounts how Richard of Saint Victor provided two alternative definitions of a person. “A person is something that exists through itself alone, singularly, according to a rational mode of existence” (34); and “A divine person is an incommunicable existence of a divine nature” (34). Richard was generally followed by his Medieval contemporaries because the Boethian definition tended toward tritheism.

In the course of his discussion, Muller deals on one side with the heretical Trinitarian doctrine of Joachim of Flora. On the other, he examines the developments in the prominent Medieval doctors such as Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas.

Medieval theologians described the Son of God as the procession of the divine intellect and the Holy Spirit as the procession of the divine will or love. In doing this however, they did not deny the fact that all the three persons in their relation to the divine essence possess the divine mind and will of God.

While we are only providing a brief survey in our review, it should be noted that Muller’s discussion of these figures often examines fine points of development (or deviation). For instance, Muller has a short but precise discussion of Dun Scotus’s Trinitarian theology. Scotus differed from Aquinas in explaining the nature of the procession of the Holy Spirit. Aquinas had argued that the eternal begetting of the Son was natural and necessary to God the Father as an expression of the Father’s intellect. Here Scotus agreed. At the same time Aquinas argued that the Holy Spirit naturally and necessarily proceeded from the Father and the Son. On this later point, Scotus disagreed. Since the procession of the Holy Spirit was an expression of the will of the Father and Son (which was free), the procession of the Holy Spirit must be free to the Father and Son rather than necessary. At the same time, as he introduces Scotus on the Trinity, Muller states that for Scotus, the procession of the Spirit is necessary to the being of God. Does Muller mean to say that for Scotus the procession of the Spirit is necessary to the being of God but not the persons of the Father and Son? As Muller points out later, Reformed scholastics did not speculate on the relationship between the Son as intellect and the Holy Spirit as will in this way. Thus, they presumably would not have agreed with Scotus’s suggestion that the procession of the Spirit was free (rather than necessary) to the Father and the Son. 

Muller also points out how Scotus anticipates the more precise formulations of the Council of Florence. Following the catholic tradition, Scotus held that the Father gave the Son to have life in himself, thus communicating to him the life by which the Spirit will also proceed from the Son as well as the Father. At the same time, Scotus claims that the Father continues to be the principal source of this life and thus the final fount of the Spirit’s procession. In this way, he anticipates the Council of Florence’s attempt to reconcile East and West, claiming that the Father is the fount of deity and the source of life by which the Spirit proceeds from the Son.

William of Ockham also receives treatment. According to Muller, while Ockham believed in the Trinity, his nominalism kept him from providing a satisfying philosophical justification for the theological language used to describe it. Muller also discusses the precise formulations of the Council of Florence. In addition to that noted above with respect to Scotus, he notes the council’s insistence in discussion with the Jacobites that the procession of the Spirit from the Father and Son is one unified procession from both persons rather than two separate processions.

Muller next examines the doctrine during the Reformation and Post-Reformation periods. He argues that the Reformers placed such a high view on Scripture that (while they followed the orthodox formulations of the ecumenical counsels) they articulated the doctrine primarily using exegetical considerations from the Word of God. Thus, Muller examines the Reformers use of Scripture as the primary norm with the tradition only as a secondary norm. As a result, the doctrine of the Trinity is upheld in all the Reformed confessions of the Reformation and Post-Reformation periods.

Muller also examines the anti-trinitarians of the era such as Michael Servetus and the Italian anti-trinitarians. Interestingly, in discussing Servetus’s rejection of the Trinity, Muller notes Servetus’s almost pantheistic views which he got partially from reading the Hermeticus. Servetus taught that the creation was an emanation of the divine essence. Perhaps here is another reason to understand why Servetus rejected the transcendent Trinitarian God of Scripture.

Dr. Muller continues with a discussion of doctrine of the Trinity during the Post-Reformation era, first in early orthodoxy and then during the era of high orthodox. We are introduced both to developments on the continent and among the English Puritans. He also examines the Reformed response both to the Socinian and Deist onslaughts. Muller’s discussion of the doctrine in Britain in the late 17th and early 18th centuries broadens to include deviations from Trinitarian orthodoxy among figures such as Bishop George Bull and William Sherlock together with William Whiston and Samuel Clarke.

After his history of the development of the doctrine, Muller discusses preliminary issues surrounding the Trinity as articulated by Reformed orthodoxy. He first shows that the orthodox believed that the doctrine of the Trinity is a fundamental article. That is, they taught that for one to be justified in Christ, he must believe in the Trinity. Ignorance of the Trinity was damnable. This does not mean that believers need to be able to articulate the doctrine with the theological precision discussed in the academy. But true Christians believe that the Father is God, the Son is God and the Holy Spirit is God, that they are three distinct uncreated persons and yet one God.

Muller then shows how the Reformed orthodox believed that the Trinity was a mystery beyond reason. They did not believe that the doctrine was revealed in natural revelation. They sought to follow this out consistently in the way they used reason in its articulation and with their use of the supposed “vestiges of the Trinity” found in nature. Since the doctrine could not be known by reason, reason could not be used to materially construct the doctrine of the Trinity in the way that it could be used by the regenerate mind to articulate a natural theology of the one God. Instead, reason could only be used instrumentally in understanding the doctrine of the Trinity as revealed in Scripture.

This also meant for most of the Reformed that there were not vestiges of the Trinity in nature. As a result, most of them did not use Augustine’s analogy of the Trinity based on the supposed tripartite nature of the human soul. Further, most of them rejected the notion that Plato recognized vestiges of the Trinity in nature. Yet there were a few exceptions among the Reformed on these points.

Muller also deals with Cartesianism and its rejection by most of the Reformed. At the same time, he notes that Burman, while mostly articulating the doctrine from Scripture, gives three rational arguments for it. One of these is the argument that if God is good the very nature of goodness is self-communicative. Thus, God could only be considered eternally good if he communicated that goodness eternally, requiring another eternal person in the divine Godhead. However, most of the Reformed did not use arguments of this nature, though some did use rational arguments to show the reasonableness of the doctrine once the doctrine was accepted on the authority of Scripture.

Next, Muller discusses the terms used in the articulation of the doctrine of the Trinity such as Trinity, substance, essence, homoousios, persona, hypostasis, perichoresis and relationes. While these terms are not in Scripture, they can be used to articulate the substance of its doctrine. If we cannot use human words to articulate the doctrine, then we can only repeat the words of Scripture without explanation, which is absurd.

Muller also deals with the connection between theology and exegesis in the 16th and 17th centuries. Muller argues that the doctrine of the Trinity is founded on patterns of pre-critical exegesis and he discusses the hermeneutical assumptions of the Reformed orthodox.

Then Muller examines particular issues of exegesis in both the Old and New Testaments. To the question, “Does the Old Testament reveal the Trinity?” The Reformed orthodox answered, “Yes”. Many of them acknowledged that the clarity of the doctrine was progressively revealed from the Old to New Testaments. However, most of them believed that it was revealed as early as creation, including the creation of man—“Let us make man in our image” (Gen. 1:26). The Reformed regularly rejected the Jewish interpretation of this passage in which God was said to be addressing the angels. Muller’s discussion here reminds one of Turretin’s in his Institutes. As Turretin noted, the angels could not be here addressed because they were not instruments of creation. They could not be since there is an infinite gap between being and non-being. Only an infinite power can bridge that gap so that man might become a living soul. The angels do not have infinite power and their finite natures are incapable of being the conduit of infinite power. Even the apostles when they performed miracles did not create anew as if the divine power flowed through them. They always attributed the power of producing miracles to Christ. They were simply the moral instruments God used to proclaim his word, with which he simultaneously produced the miracle directly by his infinite power. Muller’s discussion follows a similar line of argument adopted by the Reformed orthodox of which Turretin was simply one representative.

Muller also deals with the Trinity as it was recognized in the gospels, the epistles, and the book of Revelation. He also notes the use of the Johannine comma (1 Jn. 5:7) among the Reformers and Reformed orthodox in support of the Trinity. Its acceptance was based partially on the authority of Erasmus. But it also drew upon the observation of scribal errors such as the recognition that scribes sometimes skip lines accidentally. Perhaps, some thought, this may account for its absence in early manuscripts. However, as the textual evidence increased, its use was gradually abandoned.

Muller follows this by a detailed discussion of the loci of the Trinity as articulated by Reformed orthodoxy. He proceeds by discussing each of the persons of the Godhead. First, he deals with the person of the Father, noting the primacy accorded to the Father among the distinct persons of the Trinity. According to Muller the Reformed treated some biblical references to the Father as a specific reference to the person of the Father. This is especially clear where the Son and Spirit are differentiated from the Father such as in Matthew 28—“baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.” At the same time, in some places where God is addressed as Father, Reformed exegetes believed that the whole Trinity is included. In this respect, Muller notes the Lord’s Prayer (“Our Father”) in which at least some Reformed exegetes regarded as an address to the whole Godhead.

Muller speaks of the distinction between God’s works ad intra and ad extra. He claims that God’s works ad extra are works of the whole Godhead even when they terminate on one person. So for instance, the work of incarnation terminates on the Son, but it is the work of the whole Godhead. This helps answer the questions, “How is it that Christ alone becomes incarnate, even though all three persons of the Trinity share the same essence?” “How is it that the Father and the Spirit are not incarnate?”

The answer is implicitly given here by Muller when he states,

One and the same external work, in a different consideration, is both personal and essential.[2] Inasmuch as “the essence is common to all of the persons,” the “essential operations” are also common operations that can be considered both essentially and personally.[3] Thus, by way of example, “the incarnation of Christ, in respect of inchoation or initiation, is the essential work of the whole Trinity, but in respect of bounds or termination, it is the personal work of the Son alone,” given that Father, Son, and Spirit are equally the “cause” of the incarnation, but only the Son is incarnate.[4]

The fact that God’s ad extra works are the work of all three persons of the Trinity even when they terminate on one of the persons is also the case with election. In Scripture, election is primarily referred to the Father. But for the Reformed scholastics, this is not meant to exclude the Son and Spirit. Thus, while the work of election terminates on the Father, the Son and Spirit are also involved. Though Muller does not add to this the following observation, this may relate to the fact that for the Reformed the Trinity only had one mind and one will, even though it lives in three modes of subsistence.  This is also the case for Turretin with reference to Christ’s words, “You have not chosen me, but I have chosen you.” While Turretin interprets this in one place to refer to regeneration, in another he states that this should not be thought to exclude election, which is realized in time by regeneration. Thus, Turretin suggests that the Son also is involved in election. Muller’s examination of this issue is helpful.

Muller also deals with the person of the Son. Here we will focus our attention on the issue of the eternal begetting of the Son. For the Reformed, following the catholic tradition, eternal begetting has no beginning in time or end in time. It describes the eternal relationship between the Father and the Son that is always perfect and complete. Numerous texts are used to prove this doctrine. However, the Socinians contended that these texts only spoke about what God did in history. For instance they relegated the begetting of the Son to his incarnation or resurrection. They also relegated the procession of the Spirit to the giving of the Spirit at Pentecost. Muller deals with Reformed responses to the Socinians, dealing with texts such as Micah 5:2, Psalm 2:7, Psalm 110:3, and Proverbs 8:23 (284).

Muller’s insistence that the Reformed related these texts to eternal generation is significant. For Socinians thought that a text like Ps. 2:7 is simply a reference to a redemptive historical event such as the resurrection. But the Reformed believed that such redemptive historical events revealed something about God’s own eternal life and the eternal relationship between the Father and Son. This can be seen in Turretin when he deals with Ps. 2:7 and its quotation in Acts 13:33. He writes as follows:

Nor is the passage in Acts 13:33 an obstacle, where Paul seems to refer this oracle to the resurrection of Christ. For Ps. 2:7 is adduced by the apostle not so much to prove the resurrection of Christ (which he does, Acts 13:35 from Ps. 16:10), as to prove the fulfillment of the promise given to the fathers concerning the raising up of Christ and the sending of him into the world. These things are not to be opposed, but composed; not that generation consists in his resurrection, since even from the beginning he was with God (Jn. 1:1), yea even from everlasting (Prov. 8:22), and God speaking from heaven at his baptism testified that he was his Son; but by reason of manifestation (phaneroseos) and declaration a posteriori because he is made known by it (as Paul interprets when he says that “Christ was declared [horisthenta] to be the Son of God by the resurrection from the dead,” Rom. 1:4) according to Scripture usage by which things are said to become or to be born when they are manifested. [5]

Turretin concludes:

Because, therefore, the resurrection was an irrefragable proof of his divinity and eternal filiation, the Holy Spirit, with the Psalmist, could join both together and refer as much to the eternal generation as to its manifestation (which ought to be made in the resurrection).[6]

Thus, Ps. 2:7 proves the eternal begetting of the Son which in turn proves his divinity. In this way, the Reformed believed that the eternal relationships between the Father, Son and Spirit were the ground of their manifestation in history. This is only one example of how a Reformed scholastic interpreted a text used to prove eternal generation. This was no mere proof-text approach. Reading Muller will provide you with even more proof from Scripture that these texts do in fact speak of eternal generation. At least, the Reformed orthodox thought so. But even after proving the doctrine, there is much that needs clearing up on this subject.

In discussing Calvin, Muller notes his insistence (following the tradition from Peter Lombard) that in the Trinity there is a begetting and procession of divine persons, not of the divine essence. That is, the divine essence does not beget, but the person of the Father begets. The Reformed do not deny that the Father communicates the divine essence to the Son in the begetting of the Son. But they do deny that the divine essence itself begets the Son. That Muller implies that the Father communicates the divine essence to the Son in begetting is seen by his use of the term emanation (also used by Turretin) to describe begetting. That is, for the Reformed, the Father communicates his divine essence to the Son in begetting the Son. The implication is that when the Reformed speak of the emanation of the divine essence to the Son in his begetting they do not mean that the divine essence itself begets the Son, only that the Father communicates his divine essence to the Son when the person of the Father begets the person of the Son. That is, the divine essence does not beget divine essence or person, but person begets person.

In accord with the view that the person of the Father (not the divine essence) begets the Son, Calvin taught Christ’s aseity, that Christ’s divine essence is from itself. That is, Christ is God of himself. His divine essence is not begotten of another. This aseity of the Son was denied by the Remonstrants (17th century Arminians) who taught that the divine essence begot the Son. This became a point of contention between the Remonstrants and the Reformed throughout the 17th century.

Muller claims that Calvin’s view follows the Latin (4th Lateran Council) rather than the Greek view. Thus, Muller clarifies the Reformed view.

This argument does not, of course, contravene the doctrine of the generation of the Son from the “essence and subsistence of the Father,” but it does certainly qualify what can be meant by generation: the generation is not material and is not a “dilation of the Father’s essence,” not a propagation of the essence—but a “communication” of existence or subsistence, such that the Son is begotten, but the divine essence that he has is itself not begotten.[7] These formulations are, to say the least, quite distinct: where Ursinus speaks of a communication of Deity or Godhead by eternal generation, Polanus speaks more restrictively of a communication of Sonship or subsistence.
Still, definitions that speak of the communication of essence are not necessarily opposed to the notion of the Son’s aseitas: Bucanus also speaks of the essence as communicated, but notes that it is not begotten—sonship alone is “begotten.”[8]

To put it differently, for the Reformed this communication of the divine essence in begetting is not the dilation of the divine essence. Muller does not expand on the meaning of the term dilation. However, this statement is true whether we take the term dilation to be an expansion of the divine essence or as a reference to birth. The communication of essence does not involve an expansion of the divine essence. Also, it is not the birthing of one divine essence from another. In other words, in the Father’s eternal communication of the divine essence to the Son, there is absolutely no change in the divine essence. And it is not as though the divine essence of the Father produces a divine essence for the Son, which would be Tritheism. No, there is one divine essence communicated without division or expansion to the Son in the begetting of the Son. This communication is part and parcel of the interpenetration (if we may say so, as Turretin puts it) between the three persons of the Trinity (otherwise known as perichoresis). At the same time, the Father has primacy in the Godhead. Thus, following the catholic tradition, the Reformed speak of the Father communicating the divine essence to the Son, but they do not speak in the reverse. That is, they do not say that the Son communicates the divine essence to the Father. The Son does communicate the divine essence but only to the Spirit in spiration. Thus, the Father and the Son communicate the undivided divine essence to the Holy Spirit in spiration, but the Holy Spirit does not communicate the divine essence to the Father or the Son. In this eternal communication of essence, all three persons eternally possess the same one undivided essence. That is, they completely interpenetrate one another in terms of the divine essence (perichoresis).

To distinguish this view from Arminius’s rejection of autotheos, we should add one more clarification. For the Reformed, the divine essence was communicated in generation but the divine essence was not itself generated. Some modern Reformed theologians claim that to speak of a communication of the divine essence in begetting is to deny the teaching that Christ is autotheos, i.e., God of himself. However, this was not the perspective of Calvin or the Reformed orthodox, who did not believe that communication of essence involved the generation of the essence. Instead, it was Arminius who made this claim. At least this is how I take Muller’s comment (in the context of this discussion) that “Arminius insisted that Christ, as God, has both his sonship and his essence by generation” (329, emphasis mine). In the context of Muller’s discussion, Arminius does not simply appear to claim that the Father communicates his essence in the generation of the Son (for the Reformed believed this; see the quotes below). Arminius must be saying more, namely that the Son’s essence is generated in generation.  Thus, Arminius believed communication of essence and autotheos to be incompatible. As a result, he rejected autotheos. On the other hand, some modern Reformed theologians (agreeing with Arminius on their incompatibility) toss out communication of essence in the name of autotheos. In fact, some of them toss out eternal generation altogether because it is linked with communication of essence.

On this issue, Muller believes Amyraut clarifies the Reformed position. “Amyraut draws out in detail the argument that, considered according to the divine nature and essence that he has, Christ is a se, while considered according to the communication of that essence in the generation of his sonship, Christ is a Patre” (329). The Reformed are making a twofold distinction: his divine nature is a se, but his generation of sonship is a Patre

Turretin puts the matter even more precisely in his Institutes.

Although the Son is from the Father, nevertheless he may be called God-of-himself (autotheos), not with respect to his person, but essence; not relatively as Son (for thus he is from the Father), but absolutely as God inasmuch as he has the divine essence existing from itself and not divided or produced from another essence (but not as having that essence from himself).[9]

Following the same Reformed line, Leigh shows succinctly how Christ can both have the divine essence communicated to him by the Father and be God of himself. “Christ as God is from himself, but if the Deity of Christ be considered as in the person of the Son, so it is from the Father. The Son in respect of his essence is from none; in respect of the manner of subsistence he is from the Father”[10] (emphases mine).

In accordance with the view that the essence communicated to the Son is the same one undivided essence of the Father, Calvin and the Reformed orthodox reject subordinationism. That is, the Father and Son possess the same essence. Thus, this essence cannot be subordinated to itself. The Son cannot be subordinated to the Father, being of the same essence with him. Though some people have used John 14:28 (“the Father is greater than I”) to support subordinationism, the Reformed refer this to Christ’s human nature or to his status as mediator in his whole person. For this perspective, we can also point to Hilary, Augustine, and Athanasius.

This, Muller’s fourth volume, also shows how the Reformed defense of both Christ’s deity and the Spirit’s deity are grounded in the exegetical tradition of the day. Much of this involves the way in which the Reformed recognized similarities between different texts, otherwise known as the conflation of texts. This volume provides many exegetical insights not widely discussed at the present time. Thus, we believe that every Christian would benefit from reading the exegetical insights it contains on the deity of Christ and the Spirit. They would not only enrich their faith, but be provided with new insights into Scripture to share with Mormons and Jehovah’s Witnesses.

Muller also provides a helpful discussion of the procession of the Spirit. Most of the Reformed believed that John 15 taught the eternal procession of the Spirit, not simply the procession of the Spirit in time. Here, unlike eternal begetting, in which they could point to texts that identified the Son as Son before his incarnation (Rom. 8:3, Gal. 4:4), the Reformed were only able to point to texts that dealt with the Spirit’s procession in time. Nonetheless, most of them believed that they texts pointed to the eternal procession of the Spirit ad intra as well as his procession ad extra in redemptive history. Thus, it would seem (in our judgment) that they consistently followed out the principle the early church had used against the Sabellians. That is, they reasoned that the relational interactions of the Father, Son and Spirit in time reveal their internal relationships from eternity. This may help us to see why they saw no conflict between interpreting the texts dealing with the begetting of the Son as simultaneous references to the resurrection of Christ in history. For if the Spirit’s eternal procession is proved by giving forth the Spirit at Pentecost, it is no less the case that the Son’s eternal begetting should be proved by the resurrection.

It seems to us that the above observation should also lead all who believe in the eternal divinity of Christ and the Spirit to accept their eternal begetting and procession. For if the texts dealing with begetting or procession simply deal with the relations of the Father, Son and Spirit in time, then the persons of the Trinity begin to relate to one another in time in a way that is not grounded in the way they have always related to one another for all eternity. That is, on this view, they appear to relate to one another differently with the creation of time and redemptive history. And if they relate to one another differently, then they change. As a result, the Triune God is not changeless. In this way, the rejection of eternal begetting and procession—the relegation of begetting and procession to time—denies the unchangability of the Triune God. It makes him like a creature.

The Reformed, as part of the Western tradition, also considered the Eastern Orthodox rejection of the procession of the Spirit from the Son to be in error. However, they did not judge them to be heretical on this point because they believed that the Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son.

Dr. Muller ends this book with a final chapter that summarizes the significance of all four volumes of PRRD for the state of scholarship on the relationship between the Reformers and their Post-Reformation scholastic successors. He does this by looking at this question in general, then by considering each of the volumes distinctly. Following the overall thrust of his scholarship, Muller notes that there is general continuity between the Reformers and their Reformed scholastic successors. He also points out that this continuity existed within diversity. However, there was not simply diversity between the Reformers and their later counterparts. It included diversity amongst the Reformers themselves and among the Reformed scholastics as well. However, this diversity was built within a unified framework both synchronically (at the same time) and diachronically (through time).  Muller points out that the Arminians and the Socinians were excluded from this consensus and even considered heretical, while the federal theologians were within this consensus. Within this discussion, Muller claims that the Saumur theologians and their hypothetical universalism were considered within the bounds of Reformed orthodoxy. Muller has promoted this position throughout his later work, and we believe it remains a blot on his scholarship that needs further correction. For though we recognize that the Saumur theologians were considered within the general pale of Reformed theology (and sometimes called by writers like Turretin “our men”), they were also excluded from the pulpit in the Swiss Reformed churches under the Helvetic Consensus (1675).

This volume is certainly a crowning achievement of this set. It is clearly worth the time invested. (We could only wish Muller would continue to add to this series.) Every pastor, theologian, historian or serious student of Scripture should be encouraged to read it. Is not the Triune God the center of our Christian faith? Then how can we neglect so glorious a subject? The wealth of material this volume contains on doctrinal precision and exegesis is immense. The exegetical insights alone are worth the price of this volume. Take a dip. Taste and see. For of him—the Triune God—and through him and to him are all things. Our resurrected life as sons in the Son, as possessors of the Spirit, beloved of the Father is but the semi-eschatological foretaste of life eternal—forever before our Triune God. May that future life be enriched in us more and more as we contemplate the riches of his glory even now in Christ Jesus.

[1] Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy; ca. 1520 to ca. 1725, Volume Four: The Triunity of God. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003. 545 pp. Cloth. ISBN: 978-0-8010-2295-1. $ 59.99.

[2]Muller, PRRD, vol. 4, 259, quoting Wollebius, Compendium, I.iv, canons A.i.

[3]Ibid., quoting Wollebius, Compendium, I.iv, canons A.ii.


[5] Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, III. xxix. 8.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Muller, PRRD, vol. 4, 327, quoting Polanus, Syntagma theol., III.v (p. 215); Amyraut et al., Syntagma thesium theologicarum, I.xvii.13.

[8]Ibid., quoting Bucanus, Institutions, i (p. 11).

[9] Turretin, Institutes, III. xxviii. 40.

[10] Muller, PRRD, vol. 4, 330, quoted from Leigh, Treatise, II.xvi (p. 133).